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Abstract: In this paper, we take a political economy perspective on barriers that inhibit a transition 
beyond the growth-paradigm – that is, we frame transition barriers as looming distributional conflicts. 
Within the current paradigm, distributional conflicts are mitigated via economic growth. Hence, the 
solution of these distributional conflicts is a prerequisite for a successful transition. Specifically, we 
analyze three examples of transition barriers. First, unemployment represents the most commonly 
cited reason why economic growth is considered indispensable. Second, pension schemes rely on 
economic growth to offset demographic change. Third, alternative indicators to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) have not succeeded in replacing GDP as a standard metric of economic welfare. In 
each of these three examples, we identify actor-interest constellations that foster the status quo. We 
conclude that compensating those actors who would presumably be worse off due to a transition 
beyond the growth paradigm may be inevitable to mitigate and overcome the distributional effects to 
be triggered by the transition.  
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1 Introduction 
A puzzle: some of the proposals circulated within the degrowth-movement draw on well-known and 
rather uncontroversial arguments and yet they find only scant implementation in practice. Consider 
working time reduction (WTR, e.g. Pullinger 2014, Zwickl et al. 2016). In 1930, Keynes had famously 
asserted his expectation that within hundreds years the average work week would be reduced to fifteen 
hours; also, his fellow economist John Hicks in 1946 declared WTR a useful means of avoiding 
“secular unemployment” (cited in Bosch and Lehndorff 2001: 210) ); and Ludwig Erhard, generally 
credited as the father of Germany’s “economic miracle” in the 1950s and 1960s, assumed that the day 
where increases in leisure would be preferred to increases in material consumption would inevitably 
arrive (Erhard 1957: 233). Nevertheless, productivity gains in the last decades have mostly been 
translated in increased income as the average usual weekly hours worked on the main job in the 
OECD still stand at 40.4 in 2016.1 For another example, recall the persistence of gross domestic 
product (GDP) as the leading indicator informing policy guidelines around the world – a widely 
acknowledged misuse of a metric that merely records output. For instance, the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi 
commission, assigned by then French president Sarkozy stated: “it has long been clear that GDP is an 
inadequate metric to gauge well-being over time particularly in its economic, environmental, and 
social dimensions, some aspects of which are often referred to as sustainability” (Stiglitz et al. 2009: 
8, emphasis in original). But even though numerous alternatives to GDP have been designed, none of 
them has dethroned GDP in practice. So why have such seemingly broadly appealing causes as WTR 
and replacing GDP not been implemented on a much wider basis?  
A recent paper on barriers for alternative indicators to GDP (Bleys and Whitby 2015) points to a 
number of possible reasons for inertia, such as context (e.g., financial crisis), the alternative indicators 
themselves (e.g., lack of standardized methodology) and user factors (e.g., distrust of monetary 
aggregation). Even though these factors may be relevant, they do not inform a crucial question, to wit: 
which actor-interest constellations foster the status quo? Regarding this issue, the literature on 
transitions to sustainability and degrowth displays a gap. For instance, proponents of the dominant 
conceptual framework to analyse sustainability transitions, the Multi-Level-Perspective, have only 
recently acknowledged the need to pay more attention to the destabilization of current system 
configurations (Geels 2014); still, Geels et al. (2017: 1244) suggest that innovation policies, in 
contrast to environmental taxes, obviate the need to “impose costs on many voters and industries”. 
Overall, regime resistance and politico-economic barriers have not been at the focus of the transition 
literature (see also Strunz 2014, de Jesus and Mendonça 2018). This negligence may potentially 
backfire in that there is lot of “preaching to the choir” (van den Bergh 2011: 886) – that is, specific 
proposals persuade only post-growth advocates, but yield no substantial progress in terms of 
identifying and overcoming transformation barriers. An exception in the literature is Buch-Hansen 
(2018), who proposes general prerequisites for a degrowth paradigm shift from a transnational 
historical materialism view; yet, this still leaves the need to identify obstacles in specific contexts 
(ibid.: 162), 
                                                          
1 In the very long run, since the apex of industrialization, full time work weeks have become much shorter 
(Bosch and Lehmdorff 2011: 214ff.) whereas in the last decades they have only incrementally declined – from 
42.1 hours in 1983 to 40.4 hours in 2016, which implies a four percent decrease over thirty years. By 
comparison, productivity across the OECD – measured in GDP per hour worked – has increased by 20 percent 
between 2000 and 2015; accordingly, keeping total GDP constant would have allowed reducing working time by 
17 percent since the turn of the millennium alone. (source for OECD working time data: 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS; for productivity data see: 
https://data.oecd.org/lprdty/gdp-per-hour-worked.htm). 
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For instance, insofar as the post-growth transition restricts the exploitation of environmental resources, 
it will face severe political resistance regarding the redistribution of resource rents. The environmental 
economics literature has long emphasized that, though environmental taxes or tradable resource 
permits will often lead to an increase in overall welfare, these instruments might fail to establish a 
Pareto-improvement, as producers and consumers of environmentally damaging goods will be worse-
dispositioned (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock 1975; Downs 1973; Fullerton 2011; Jenkins 2014). 
Consequently, environmental policy usually not only induces substantial rent seeking activities but 
also runs the risk of being blocked or disfigured by well-organized interest groups. Therefore, in order 
to develop politically feasible (i.e., democratically legitimated) approaches for environmental 
protection, various mechanisms to compensate potential disadvantaged parties have been proposed, 
some of which have seen application in practice (e.g. Bovenberg 2001; Gersbach and Requate 2004; 
Fischer 2001; Frederiksson and Sterner 2005; Sterner 2006).  
Nevertheless, a transition not only restricting natural resource use but also potentially (or even 
intentionally) cropping economic growth rates is likely to face additional resistance from those who 
currently profit from GDP-growth – any increase in overall welfare due to reduced pollution, less 
working hours or decreased consumption based on status competition notwithstanding. Still, the 
degrowth-related literature sidelines such compensation approaches, calling for radical breaks with 
institutional structures (e.g. Deriu 2012, Klein 2014). Thus, we find a somewhat paradoxical situation: 
the degrowth-movement hopes for radical institutional renewal whereas specific proposals that enjoy 
widespread support, such as WTR and alternative indicators to GDP, do not find much application in 
practice. Moreover, it remains open whether and how those institutions, which many degrowthists 
would like to keep, can be adapted to a post-growth economy. For instance, Demaria et al. (2013: 203) 
argue that “some form of social security and public health, public kindergarten and schools, or some 
other elements of the welfare state” need “to be defended” – but they are silent on what this demand 
might entail more specifically.  
This, in turn, is the starting point of present paper: it aims to identify relevant actor-interest 
constellations that inhibit the transformation beyond the growth paradigm. In principle, all actors 
profiting from GDP-growth should be taken into account. Our basic presumption is that in order to 
understand the persistence of the growth paradigm, an identification of these politico-economic 
transformation barriers is indispensable. To do so, we employ a political economy perspective (see 
Mueller 2003). This perspective centers on the self-interest of all actors involved in the political 
process in representative democracies – voters, politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats. Based on 
this perspective, we analyze three specific examples of transition barriers. First, unemployment 
represents the most commonly cited reason why economic growth is considered indispensable since 
without overall growth of economic output, productivity gains increase unemployment. Second, 
pension schemes rely on economic growth to offset demographic change. Third, alternative indicators 
to GDP have not succeeded in replacing GDP as a standard metric of economic welfare. In each of 
these three examples, we rely on the political economy perspective to identify actor-interest 
constellations that prolong the status quo.   
Against the background of these examples, the following question arises: how to achieve sufficient 
consent of those actors whom the ‘turn of the tide’ caused by a post-growth transition would leave 
worse off?2 In short, there will be no transition without addressing distributional conflicts. Assuming 
                                                          
2 This is not to say that economic growth necessarily makes everyone better off: the political economy 
perspective also implies that private interests can be framed and disguised under the trickle-down narrative that 
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that these conflicts are to be mitigated in a peaceful and democratically legitimated way, compensation 
may be one (but not the only) inevitable consequence where persuasion does not succeed. As we will 
see, the arising cleavages are more complex than “capital vs. labor” or “the 1% vs. the 99%”. While 
reduction of economic inequality may represent an important cornerstone of transition policies, the 
transition also pins different regions, different generations or different administrations against each 
other. Thus, the present paper seeks to remind post-growth proponents that the transition requires more 
than the collection and elaboration of techniques that will formally result in a sustainable rate of 
material throughput (e.g., Daly 2017:101). Rather, deliberate strategies to overcome political economy 
barriers to change have to be developed. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the conceptual framework by 
introducing the basic assumptions of the political economy perspective and providing a working 
definition of post-growth economy. Based on this framework, Section 3 analyzes which actor-interest 
constellations inhibit the post-growth transition within the three examples of unemployment, pension 
schemes and alternatives to GDP. Finally, Section 4 discusses the results. 
2 Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Political Economy 
As conceptual framework, this paper draws on the assumptions of the political economy literature. 
This perspective focuses on the self-interest of different actor groups within institutional settings as 
main explanatory variable for the societal allocation of rents: through the co-evolution of actor groups 
and institutions, the well-organized actors obtain more rents at the expense of the less-organized 
actors. In Buchanan’s (1984) words, the political economy perspective comes down to a “politics 
without romance” view. More specifically, the following assumptions are made regarding the rationale 
of actor groups in representative democracies: 
• Voters decide rationally; that is, they aim at maximizing the expected income which they can 
derive under the future government. To do so, they cast their votes comparing different 
election platforms (Downs 1957). To be sure, non-monetary issues such as environmental 
preferences may also form part of voter’s interest. However, the hypothesis of self-interest-
driven voting behavior finds some empirical corroboration: for instance, Scruggs and Benegal 
(2012) demonstrate that the publicly perceived importance of climate mitigation declined in 
the wake of the financial and economic crisis, as a result of which economic concerns 
exceeded environmental concerns. 
• Interest groups engage in rent-seeking. That is, they aim to influence regulation in their favor. 
Different interest groups compete in this quest, for instance via public campaigns and direct 
lobbying of politicians. Eventually, well-organized interest-groups succeed in steering rents in 
their direction; they do so at the expense of the wider public and their less well organized 
competitors (Olson 1971, Stigler 1971). 
• Politicians act as transfer brokers between different interest groups. They allocate rents so as 
to maximize stakeholder support and thereby maximize their chance of electoral success 
(McCormick and Tollison 1981). Certainly, the politicians’ own ideological motivations also 
play a role (e.g., Peltzman 1976); yet ideology is not to be thought of as ‘prior’ or somehow 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
growth naturally benefits everyone. Empirically, the benefits from economic growth have been highly unevenly 
distributed in the past (e.g., Dabla-Norris et al. 2015, Piketty 2014). 
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more fundamental than self-interest but rather as a complementary driver (self-interest may 
also be disguised as ideology). Overall, interests, ideas and institutions are to be seen as 
interdependent (May and Jochim 2013). 
• Bureaucracy, far from representing a simple executive body, pursues its own agenda 
(Niskanen 1971). Bureaucrats do not just implement policies – on the contrary, they also 
follow their self-interest, aiming at increasing their competencies both as regards the 
conception of policies and budgetary discretion. Different ministries compete for regulatory 
influence, executive power and budget.  
These assumptions, for instance, explain why environmental interests are commonly disadvantaged 
compared to well-organized interest groups from different industry sectors (Kirchgässner and 
Schneider 2003). Such well-organized interest groups may succeed in regulatory capture, thereby 
making environmental policy inadequate and inefficient (Kollmann and Kirchgässner 2010, see also 
Dal Bó 2006). 
How can the political economy framework be justified in the context of this paper – given that the 
degrowth movement aims to replace “the culture of greed [that] proliferated both in the private and 
public sectors as the unrestrained pursuit of short-term self-interest” (Kallis et al. 2012: 173)? Three 
reasons speak in favor of the political economy perspective. First, although the degrowth vision is 
often associated with more communal forms of democracy, the actual policy proposals discussed in 
the degrowth literature, “are national top-down approaches, focusing on government as a major driver 
of change, rather than local bottom-up approaches” (see the systematic literature review by Cosme et 
al. 2017: 321). So understanding the barriers for degrowth policies requires an apt explanatory 
framework for policy formation in representative democracies – such as the political economy 
perspective. Second, and more generally, in order to overcome transformation barriers, the 
mechanisms of current political systems need to be accounted for (even if they are to be criticized 
from a normative point of view): “The political process cannot be assumed away if we are to actually 
make the transition to sustainability” (Klitgaard 2013: 280). Third, self-interest constitutes a 
fundamental category of human behavior whose relevance transcends the growth paradigm: thus, 
deliberative accounts of democracy, as often favored within the degrowth movement, also need to 
come to terms with “constrained self-interest” and coercive power in democratic processes 
(Mansbridge et al. 2010).3  
2.2 Beyond the growth paradigm 
In the following, we provide a sketch of what we mean by “post-growth transformation”. We prefer 
the term “post-growth”, which is very popular in the German-speaking countries (e.g. Paech 2012, 
Seidl and Zahrnt 2010) to “degrowth”, the most obvious alternative. This is not only because the 
prefix “post-” indicates the aim of going beyond the current paradigm, but also for two substantial 
reasons. First, degrowth comprises a heterogeneous range of positions, some of which radically 
oppose the institutions of democratic capitalism and explicitly call for revolutionary system change 
(see Asara et al. 2013, as well as the empirical study of attendants to the 2014 degrowth-conference by 
Eversberg and Schmelzer 2017). By comparison, this paper remains committed to a more reformist 
perspective, essentially asking what it would take to leave the growth paradigm behind, given the 
                                                          
3 “The regulative ideal of absent power in deliberative interactions prescribes reducing to a practical minimum 
the threat of sanction and the use of force against another’s interests” (Mansbridge et al. 2010: 82). 
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prevailing democratic settings.4 Second, we concur with van den Bergh (2011: 889) that, while 
downsizing of the economy may be the inevitable result of adequate sustainability policies, it is “at 
best blunt, ineffective and inefficient” as a sustainability policy by itself: degrowth sidelines the 
composition of economic systems as a crucial instrument insofar as it frames downscaling as the only 
instrument ‘that does the job’ of reducing material throughput. In the same vein, Daly (2017: 85) 
warns us not to confound “reallocation with aggregate growth. There are generally always possibilities 
of better allocation – more of something desired in exchange for a reduction of something less 
desired”. 
Thus, the perspective advanced here basically follows van den Bergh’s (2011, 2017) plea for 
agnosticism with respect to economic growth. A tentative characterization of a post-growth economy 
(or “a-growth”, as suggested by van den Bergh – ultimately, terminology is not decisive here) might 
refer to three specific features or conditions: 
(1) material throughput is in line with ecological limits, 
(2) GDP does not inform major policy decisions,  
(3) productivity gains are translated into decreasing material throughput and into more leisure 
until condition (1) is satisfied. 
We take (1) to be the basic tenet of ecological economics, so we will not elaborate on it any further. 
(2) implies that GDP has ceased to attract much interest, possibly with the exception of a small group 
of economic statisticians who record the output of the economy. The broad lines of economic, social 
and environmental policies orient themselves towards broader indicators of sustainable well-being 
(Costanza et al. 2014). Emphatically, (3) presupposes that productivity gains will on average not be 
absent in a post-growth economy – on the contrary, reorganizations and qualitative development 
represent a desirable feature of an economy in line with ecological limits (Daly 2017). Without 
improvements in productivity, only stagnation remains. In a sense, as pointed out by Aldred (2009: 
66), it can be regarded as an artifact of the GDP indicator that it registers (3) as non-growth. Summing 
up, a post-growth economy, in our view, exhibits increases in productivity but not in material 
throughput.  
Connecting this miniature sketch together with the theoretical approach outlined in the preceding 
subsection puts analytical focus on the distributional consequences of a post-growth transition. Within 
the growth paradigm income generating structures have evolved that crucially depend on the 
continuous increase of material wealth: There are business models specialized in growing markets or 
in the growth-driven increase of asset values, policy entrepreneurs whose electoral success is closely 
tied to the increase of income of their electorate and bureaucracies whose budgets and political 
influence might shrink in the face of a post-growth economy’s tighter environmental regulation. 
Accordingly, post-growth induced structural changes to the composition of the economy may not 
unfold Pareto-neutrally. Furthermore, some post-growth policy strategies might directly reduce 
income for some, irrespective of growth rates. For example, a more equal distribution of work means 
                                                          
4 Broader institutional change may well be normatively desirable and form part of a post-growth transition, yet 
this issue lies beyond the scope of the present paper. We do not follow those degrowthists who rule out the 
compatibility of representative democracies and degrowth in the first place and who assert that the growth 
paradigm has completely undermined democracy: for instance, Deriu (2012: 56) disparagingly refers to the “so-
called democratic countries” where “citizens are in fact at the mercy of immense and impersonal powers”. 
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less material goods for those who work less. All redistributions face potential resistance from those 
who will be worse off.  
In order to get a more precise picture of the emerging conflict lines, we now turn to three specific case 
studies. In each of these our aim is to identify actor-interest constellations that impede a post-growth 
transition.  
3 Case Studies 
3.1 Unemployment 
One of the most widely shared political talking-point says that economic growth is needed to combat 
unemployment. And in fact, broad empirical evidence attests to a negative correlation between growth 
and unemployment in market economies: when aggregate demand and output fall, this is usually 
accompanied by a rise of the unemployment rate (e.g., Lee 2000; Sögner and Stiassny 2002). The 
degree of responsiveness of the unemployment rate to output varies from country to country, but 
overall, the relationship is so stable that economists refer to it as “Okun’s law” (see Ball et al. 2013). 
What creates this relationship? While one possible causal direction is that decreased employment leads 
to a reduction in labor supply and thus in output growth, the relationship can also point into the other 
direction and be interpreted as a “productivity trap” of market economies (Jackson and Victor 2011): 
If continuously increasing labor productivity implies that less and less labor is needed to produce the 
same amount of goods and services, than, ceteris paribus, output growth is necessary to avoid a rise in 
unemployment.  
As long as income from labor is a key mechanism of distribution of wealth, a post-growth perspective 
poses the question of whether and how this productivity trap can be overcome since a simple reduction 
in growth rates might severely increase unemployment (Victor 2008). Jackson and Victor (2011: 140-
144) point towards two options (Antal 2014 reviews other possible routes, which, however, are not 
judged fruitful in the end): first, working time reduction (WTR) may help to distribute work more 
evenly. Second, a structural shift towards low-productivity sectors like nursing, education or volunteer 
work could slow down or even reverse the trend of rising average labor productivity and with it the 
specter of post-growth unemployment. 
Especially the idea of a substantial WTR has found a positive echo within the post-growth literature 
(e.g., Antal 2014; Cosme et al. 2017; Kallis et al. 2012, 2014; Martínez-Alier et al. 2010; Passadakis 
2015; Pullinger 2014). Levy (2017:316) has even labeled WTR as „the iconic reform for the degrowth 
movement“. However, ignoring the question marks regarding whether WTR is suitable for effectively 
limiting economic output or consumption (Du et al. 2013; Keizer 2011:49 ff.; Pullinger 2014: 12 f.),5 
respective policy measures risk to further accentuate the cleavage between high and low income 
workers. On the one hand, high income workers might profit from a shift from work to leisure, as 
higher occupational functions like lawyers tend to work longer than they would do according to their 
own preferences (Estevão and Sá 2008:4 ff.). Collectively binding working hour reductions would 
thus end a classic prisoner’s dilemma and result in higher overall utility for this group as marginal 
utility from work income and leisure converges. 
                                                          
5 Some empirical studies rather indicate, that welfare might actually decrease due to the deterioration of working 
conditions, as often employers do not hire additional workers in response to WTR-policies but instead simply 
increase work intensity for the unchanged staff (Hayden 2006:529; Keizer 2011:150). 
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On the other hand, workers with low hourly wage can rather be expected to opt for long work hours in 
order to raise sufficient income. A mandatory and blanket working time reduction policy then risks 
distorting individual allocation of time between work and recreation and might yield severe budget 
problems for low income households. Even if this is not the case – for example, when only future 
productivity gains are translated into WTR, thus keeping income constant –, a reduction of working 
time is, ceteris paribus, likely to increase the disparities between low and high income workers as the 
former might not gain as much utility from increased leisure due to income constraints or less favorite 
working conditions often accompanying their work. As Hayden (2006: 529) notes in his evaluation of 
the 35 hour week in France: „For some employees, WTR opened up new leisure opportunities 
including more short-term travel, while for others with insufficient incomes and less predictable 
schedules, it could mean more idle time in France’s dreary working-class suburbs”. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that acceptance of the WTR-induced income reduction is higher in high income brackets 
(Hayden 2006:529). If, alternatively, WTR is introduced as a voluntary option, it can be expected that 
especially those with high hourly wages will opt for reduced hours. In this scenario, rising income 
inequality is simply replaced by rising leisure inequality (Pullinger 2014:17).  
Acceptance of WTR policy-measure might even further decline as firms sometimes use this occasion 
to crop labor rights (e.g., Levy 2017:316), which is one reason why labor unions have opposed such 
changes in the past (e.g., Keizer 2011:150; Levy 2017:314). Thus, in addition to the potential conflict 
between low- and high income workers, struggles between employers and employees are to be 
expected. Even if working conditions remain unchanged, securing consent with many workers, 
conflicts with employers might arise because the employment of part time workers usually means 
additional administrative and transaction costs for firms (Zwickl et al. 2016: 249). In general, business 
interest groups prefer fewer employees with longer hours and, therefore, tend to object to WTR 
(Pullinger 2014:17). 
The remedy sometimes offered especially to the problem of increasing inequality within the workforce 
is a higher hourly wage for low income workers (Hayden 2006:529; Pullinger 2014: 16) or even the 
preservation of the full income (Passadakis 2015:105). However, if this is directly facilitated by wage 
increases, prices will rise, and, in consequence, demand, output and employment will fall (Antal 2014: 
282; Estevao and Sá 2008:3f; Hunt 1999). This “lump-of-labor fallacy” (Estevao and Sá 2008:3) and 
resistance by entrepreneurs against higher wages (e.g. Hayden 2006: 504) might be circumvented if 
income compensation is established via public subsidies. The vast extent of subsidies necessary to 
compensate for a substantial WTR, however, would constrain public spending in other areas and thus 
create alternative conflicts.  
The second proposal to prevent rising unemployment in a post-growth society (e.g., Jackson and 
Victor 2011), shifting labor to low productivity sectors (e.g. personal services like nursing), is also 
riddled with conflict potential. If wages in the low-productivity sectors remain low, more and more 
workers will find themselves in relatively low paying jobs compared to those in high-productivity 
sectors. Then again, employers in the low-productivity sectors need to pay wages that are competitive 
with the rest of the economy so as to avoid losing staff. Thus, these sectors face what is called 
Baumol’s cost disease (Baumol 2012): the relative costs of personal services rise (e.g. Bates and 
Santerre 2013 on the health sector) compared to the costs of other goods and services. This tendency is 
often misinterpreted as rising absolute costs of services, including public ones, though, as Aldred 
(2009: 68-75) points out, personal services actually tend to get cheaper in terms of hours worked to 
produce the same output. Nevertheless, increasing pressure on politicians by advocates of a lean 
government is to be expected because the state is a major supplier of personal services. In other words, 
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if more and more teaching and nursing activities are carried out on behalf of the government, already 
existing tensions between opponents and supporters of the welfare state will increase. Overall, 
structural shifts to the low-productivity sector are hampered, either by rising income inequality or by 
Baumol’s cost disease. 
In sum, distributional issues impede the two main strategies to combat unemployment in a post-growth 
economy. WTR risks new cleavages between different groups of workers, employers and employees 
as well as between the workforce and the workless. A shift toward the low-productivity sector needs to 
overcome vested interest-driven pressure against increasing social welfare budgets.     
3.2 Pension schemes 
In a nutshell, existing pension schemes rely on economic growth to offset demographic change. As 
pensions are to be understood as claims on future output (e.g., Barr 2004), demographic change in the 
form of ageing populations means that meeting these claims becomes more difficult: pensioners can 
consume only those goods and services that are produced and provided by the currently working 
generations. Against this background, a growing economy permits the distribution of goods and 
services towards the growing older generations while easing the additional burden on the younger 
generations. The crucial issue, therefore, is how to cope with demographic change without growth?  
The two most common pensions schemes are pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes and funded schemes. In 
PAYG-schemes the currently young generations directly finance the pensions of the current retirees. 
By implication, the effects of demographic ageing are completely transparent: economic growth is 
necessary to avoid pension reductions or increases of the younger generations’ contributions. In 
funded schemes, pensions are financed from capital accumulation in pension funds. This is another 
way of saying that pension funds are explicitly based on real economic growth (assuming that 
financial assets reflect real forms of capital). In the context of low- or zero growth, returns on 
investments will be lower compared to the fund managers’ expectations at the time when future 
pensions were calculated. “Consequently, pension funds offering defined-benefit promises and life 
insurance companies that have sold products with high-return guarantees may have difficulty fulfilling 
these promises” (Antolin et al. 2011: 238). As a result, pension funds may seek higher yields via 
riskier investments, that is, they may engage in “gambling for redemption” (ibid.: 239). And indeed, 
empirical evidence demonstrates that pension funds tend to high risk investments in a low-interest 
environment (Boubaker et al. 2017). Pension funds may also strategically invest in emerging countries 
with a younger age structure, thereby offsetting demographic trends – yet this possibly raises ethical 
concerns in case investments are not adequate to stimulate sustainable local development so that 
effectively young and poor populations finance old and rich populations (Höpflinger 2010). In 
principle, pension funds might be adapted to a post-growth economy by anticipating lower returns and 
gearing investments towards sustainable development (see Della Croce et al. 2011). But it seems clear 
that the working logic of current pension funds combined with the overall trend to extend such 
schemes impede rather than facilitate the prospects of a post-growth transition (Seidl and Zahrnt 
2016).  
Overall, the double challenge of demographic ageing and post-growth transition means that either 
pensioners will have to receive less/work longer and/or contributions of the working generations will 
have to rise. Which specific actor-interest constellations inhibit such adaptations? First, the older 
generations as voters can lobby against pension reductions or longer working times. High participation 
rates of elderly voters in elections, combined with rising life expectancy entails a strong impact on 
public policy – Sinn and Übelmesser (2002) even predict a “path to gerontocracy”. Empirically, the 
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elderlies’ electoral preferences for generous pension systems, and, in consequence, their impact on 
agenda setting and social policy making, have been clearly demonstrated (e.g., Campbell 2003, Bonoli 
and Häusermann 2009). As one example of politicians’ catering to the interests of elderly voters, 
consider the German Conservative Party’s promotion of a “mothers’ pension” (Mütterrente) during the 
run-up to the German federal election in 2013. The measure, which constituted one of the 
Conservatives’ main campaign pledges, revolved around an extended re-imbursement for child care 
times. Following the Conservatives’ electoral victory, the measure has been implemented, its cost 
being borne by those currently paying pension contributions and by pensioners that do not have a child 
born before 1992 (see Bach et al. 2014). 
While demographic ageing and lower electoral participation rates imply a weaker and less well 
organized representation of the younger generations’ interests (compared to elderly voters)6, these 
interests also find a very well-organized ally: the interest groups of the business and industry sector 
lobby against increased pension contributions by the working population. These interest groups object 
to any increases in labor costs, among them higher pension contributions. Hence, pension 
contributions are regularly framed as a “drag on competitiveness”. For instance, a position paper by 
Businesseurope, a lobby group representing enterprises and national business federations in Europe, 
explicitly argues that a main goal of pension reforms should lie in sustaining economic growth: one of 
Businesseurope’s “key messages” on pension schemes says that the latter should be continuously 
reformed in order to ensure their financial viability and “to avoid negative impacts on economic 
growth” (Businesseurope 2012: 1). Similarly, the “Initiative New Social Market Economy”, a think 
tank funded by the German employers’ association of the metal and electrical industries, lobbies 
against “pension gifts” and calls for an upper limit on social security contributions which are said to 
not only put a strain on the working population but also on the competitiveness of many enterprises 
(INSM 2015, Pellengahr 2017). 
Against this background, politicans who aim for (re-)election and intend to minimize interest group 
resistance, have the clear incentive to increase tax-funding of pensions, particularly PAYG schemes. 
Tax-funding enables burying distributional effects between generations within the wider tax 
framework. So not surprisingly, this route is already well-trodden: tax-funding already accounts for 
roughly a third of Germany’s pension budget (see Seidl and Zahrnt 2016). At times, tax-funded 
programs targeting the elderly, such as Medicare (a healthcare program for people over 65) in the US, 
are extended, “even as other programs for the poor are cut” (Campbell 2003: 2). 
Summing up, a post-growth transition would not introduce novel challenges to pension schemes. 
Rather a post-growth transition would aggravate the already existing pressures on pension schemes 
due to demographic ageing and the recent trend toward “secular stagnation” with excess savings, low 
growth and low interest rates (IMF 2016). As a result, age can be expected to further intensify as a 
distributional conflict line and tax-funding of PAYG schemes will increase. Moreover, pension fund 
managers that have relied on high returns from investments on capital markets in the past will not be 
in favor of post-growth strategies; they are likely to call for government bailouts to meet the promises 
incurred in defined-benefit schemes.  
                                                          
6 However, the working age population may resort to a number of evasion strategies so as to minimize pension 
contributions, so part of the burden of demographic ageing might fall on pensioners (see Breyer and Stolte 
2001). 
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3.3 Alternative indicators replacing GDP  
The limitations of GDP as a reliable indicator for happiness or even material wealth have been widely 
and for quite some time acknowledged, not only in the post-growth movement. Kuznet as one of the 
main architects of the US national accounting system already pointed in the 1930s to the indicator’s 
severe limitations (Costanza et al. 2009: 7 f.).  
Nevertheless, despite several well developed alternatives (Costanza et al. 2014; van den Bergh and 
Antal 2014), GDP continues to be the dominant measure for economic progress; hence, GDP growth 
constitutes a key figure for political success. Technical issues like data availability and methodological 
flaws in some alternative indicators may provide some explanation for GDP’s persistence (Bleys and 
Whitby 2015). Yet technical issues do not suffice as an explanation. Instead, political economy 
barriers are likely to account for crucial inertia. 
Generally speaking, substituting alternative welfare indicators for GDP creates resistance by those 
benefitting from GDP as lead indicator. First and foremost, this concerns politicians. Two different 
motives for resistance can be distinguished: For one, those politicians forming the government and its 
supporting parties might face a critical re-evaluation of their current performance or political legacy 
once another indicator is used. As some studies have shown, including environmental damages and 
other neglected welfare aspects into the national welfare accounting yields far less favorable results 
than GDP often does and sometimes even indicates decreasing wealth in comprehensive terms (e.g., 
Kubiszewski et al. 2013). Any government deciding to replace GDP thus might severely damage its 
chances for reelection. It may be no coincidence, therefore, that the former French president Sarkozy 
initiated a report on alternative welfare indicators when growth-predictions in terms of GDP were 
quite unfavorable (van den Bergh 2017: 201 f). 
A second, similar reason for politicians not to abandon GDP could be that a re-evaluation of their 
policies undermines their relative power position within the political system. The failed initiative to 
launch a Green GDP in China in 2006 provides a vivid example: Li and Lang (2009) and Steinhardt 
and Jiang (2007) have reported that the once promising reform project, which had already been 
successfully tested at selected regions, was eventually scrapped due to fierce resistance by local 
politicians. With the Green GDP results drawing nigh at a nationwide level, including data for every 
region, many local cadres were confronted with an imminent loss of political influence and prestige as 
their regional economic performance would have been rated more negatively while other regions 
would suddenly be better off.  
Local politicians, however, where not the only source of resistance against accounting reforms: The 
case of China’s atrophied Green GDP initiative illustrates that also within the bureaucracy struggles 
emerged. Li and Lang (2009: 54) cite a leading engineer of the Chinese State Environmental 
Protection Agency with the point of view that the agency’s frictions with the National Bureau of 
Statistics contributed even more to the reform’s failure than the resistance by local cadres. In the end, 
the authors conclude that “discordance over the [Green GDP] report’s technicalities and content, in a 
sense, seem to be only a façade, disguising the more fundamental local resistance and their organised 
lobbying efforts at the central level” (ibid.). 
While in this case both administrative units appear to have rather acted as proxies for various political 
agents in the background (ibid, p. 56), it is easily conceivable that public agencies interfere on their 
own accord. If sustainability inspired post-growth policies lead to more stringent and wide-ranging 
environmental policy measures, ministries responsible for environmental protection will probably 
enjoy greater competencies and budgets, as it is well known that assigning these tasks to agencies with 
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different foci will compromise their success (e.g., Schucht et al. 2001: 272 f.). This competence shift 
implies a relative decline of influence and possibly also budgets of traditionally predominant 
ministries (e.g, of finance or commerce), which, therefore, possess an incentive obstruct alternative 
accounting measures (Bleys and Whitby 2015: 168;). What is more, in case the national accounting 
procedure, which usually is not in the environmental ministry’s domain, remains in the competency of 
a potential loser of the reform, the responsible bureaucrats have ample opportunities to thwart the 
transformation process by using technical difficulties as a pretext. The above mentioned classification 
of the discussion of the Chinese Green GDP report’s details as a ‘façade’ exemplifies this risk. 
Alternative indicators to GDP also face other challenges. Interest groups from polluting industries can 
be expected to oppose “green” indicators insofar as these indicators might trigger stricter regulation of 
the dirty sectors of an economy. For instance, in 1994 a green accounting proposal in the US “was 
killed by the coal industry” (Costanza et al. 2014: 285). Moreover, on the international level, countries 
that have unsustainably depleted their natural capital will be averse to green GDP-alternatives. By 
comparison, countries whose ranking would improve under a green indicator might welcome a switch. 
Such inter-country comparisons might be particularly relevant as government debt, usually measured 
in GDP per capita, is rising worldwide:7 with rising absolute debt levels, GDP needs to grow if 
debt/GDP per capita is to remain constant. Replacing GDP with alternative indicators, therefore, 
would provoke resistance from those countries whose debt ratio is set to deteriorate under an 
alternative indicator. 
In sum, the persistence of GDP as a lead indicator for policy decisions cannot be put on technical 
issues alone. Rather, the GDP indicator is tied to the self-interest of a range of actors: bureaucracies, 
governments and interest groups on different scales benefit from it, either directly because they are 
actively involved in administering the indicator or indirectly because their relative position (power, 
economic ranking,…) would worsen if alternative indicators were used. 
4 Discussion 
Regarding China’s failed attempt to green its GDP, Li and Lang (2009:57) conclude that ‘In light of 
these intricate [political economy] challenges, the fate of the green GDP study, as Chinese 
commentators have also noted, was almost predestined to failure’. This illustrates the main argument 
put forward here: If distributional conflicts are neglected, post-growth policy proposals are likely to 
remain politically anemic. Within the three case studies analyzed above, distributional conflicts arise 
in different ways, suggesting different remedies:  
In the first case study, unemployment, WTR and a structural shift toward the low-productivity sector 
constitute the two primary options to prevent increases in unemployment. Yet these measures may 
entail tensions between high and low income workers, between workers of certain sectors, between 
employers and employees, or between the working and the non-working population. The behavioral 
phenomenon of loss aversion suggests that these tensions will arise specifically if one group faces 
income losses compared to the status quo (cf. Barberis 2013). Therefore, one possible solution may 
consist in limiting WTR policies to translating only future productivity gains into leisure: such more 
gradual – capping instead of cropping – policies might be less prone to being interpreted as material 
losses and could turn out more palatable.  
                                                          
7 For instance, see https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.DOD.TOTL.GD.ZS 
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Regarding the second case study, pension schemes, the prospect of a post-growth transition would 
exacerbate existing challenges due to demographic ageing. In general, age may be the most relevant 
cleavage in distributional conflicts around the welfare state (Bonoli and Häusermann 2009). Against 
this background, already observed tendencies towards tax-funding of pensions can be expected to 
thrive: tax-funding probably represents the least resistance-provoking way to mitigate the 
distributional generational cleavage – if at the price of concealing and dodging the actual distributive 
issues at hand.  
The third case study illustrates that a shift from GDP toward alternative indicators of welfare is likely 
to worsen the relative ranking and/or political influence of some actors. Consent of these actors might 
require compensation and/or some form of face-saving opportunity insofar as non-pecuniary losses, 
e.g. in terms of prestige, occur. For instance, a region whose GDP is heavily tied to the depletion of 
natural resources needs a plausible scenario how to economically adapt and culturally re-invent itself 
under a post-GDP framework.8 
The diversity of distributional issues notwithstanding, we might derive some general propositions 
from our analysis. First, contrary to ‘traditional’ conflicts of environmental policy, distributional 
battles amplified or ignited by post-growth policies will not be limited to natural resource users. 
Rather, a variety of interest constellations might emerge, depending on reactions of the political or 
economic system to these policies. Sometimes, as the case of China’s failed Green GDP experiment 
illustrates, not all conflicts can be readily anticipated. Second, the arising cleavages will also be more 
complex than “capital vs. labor”: for instance, conflict lines may sort along regional, administrative or 
generational lines. By implication, redistributive measures to limit income and wealth inequality 
(albeit necessary) will not be sufficient to facilitate a post-growth transition. Third, pecuniary 
redistribution may not be easily available or may not suffice. For example, the loss of political power 
or prestige can hardly be fully substituted for by subsidies. In addition to that, some policies, like 
WTR or choosing an alternative national accounting indicator, simply do not generate any revenue that 
can be distributed. Though the shift towards a post-growth economy might constitute a Pareto-
improvement, increased welfare resulting from more leisure or less work related stress does not yield 
any pecuniary outcome. Therefore, fourth, the post-growth transition is likely to involve rising public 
budgets (e.g., wage subsidies, increased social security spending). This concerns both intended 
measures, such as implementing a structural shift towards sectors with low labor productivity, and 
politico-economic side-effects, such as tax-financing of pension schemes. 
In conclusion, the political economy view is essential for mapping feasible transformation pathways. 
The status quo of unsustainable growth benefits a wide range of actors that can be expected to obstruct 
any post-growth agenda. Therefore, strategies to mitigate this resistance have to be formulated if such 
an agenda is to succeed. These mitigation strategies might be normatively unappealing in some 
respects: the very opponents of a sustainable post-growth transformation might have to be 
compensated. Then again, the examples above caution us not to caricature the opposition as ‘greedy 
capitalists’ but rather to consider legitimate interest groups such as labor unions or pensioners. 
                                                          
8 Consider the example of the Lausitz region in East Germany where lignite mining is structurally important for 
an otherwise weak regional economy. Germany will need to gradually phase out coal power plants if it wants to 
meet its climate protection targets. A coal phase-out, in turn, will have strong distributional effects (overall, it is 
projected to incur redistributions of about 70bn €, Hecking et al. 2016), which will be particularly negative for 
regions such as the Lausitz where lignite is – so far – the only relevant industry. 
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This already indicates the potential scale of resistance against post-growth policies. Recently, the 
challenge to limit climate change has been compared to the abolition of slavery in the 19th century: the 
owners of fossil resources will be stripped of several trillions dollars in wealth, a magnitude similar to 
the economic consequences of expropriating US slave owners at that time (Hayes 2014, Klein 2014).. 
The example of slavery demonstrates both the challenge’s extent and possible ways out: in the US, the 
abolitionist movement, which threatened the South’s slave economy, was one important factor for the 
South’s secession from the Union, and, in consequence, the American Civil War (e.g., Weingast 
1998). In the UK, however, the Slavery Abolition Act 1833 compensated slave owners and thus 
ensured a peaceful transition (ibid.).  
A considerate and politically promising post-growth movement will, therefore, have to address the 
looming conflicts of the desired transition. As we have argued, this necessitates economic reforms 
(e.g., WTR) as well as compensations (e.g., to low-wage earners or natural resource owners). Of 
course, if available, preventing conflicts in the first place might be preferable.9 Regarding 
compensations, securing political majorities and thus democratic legitimacy in the face of limited 
public budgets inevitably relies on popularizing the mostly non-pecuniary benefits of the transition 
(e.g., more leisure, improved environment). So both cultural change and compensation to opposing 
interests will be required for a post-growth transformation to succeed in an open democratic society. 
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